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k -times Attribute-Based Anonymous Access
Control for Cloud Computing
Tsz Hon Yuen, Joseph K. Liu∗ , Man Ho Au, Xinyi Huang, Willy Susilo, Jianying Zhou

Abstract—In this paper, we propose a new notion called k-times
attribute-based anonymous access control, which is particularly
designed for supporting cloud computing environment. In this
new notion, a user can authenticate himself/herself to the cloud
computing server anonymously. The server only knows the user
acquires some required attributes, yet it does not know the
identity of this user. In addition, we provide a k-times limit
for anonymous access control. That is, the server may limit a
particular set of users (i.e., those users with the same set of
attribute) to access the system for a maximum k-times within a
period or an event. Further additional access will be denied. We
also prove the security of our instantiation. Our implementation
result shows that our scheme is practical.

Keywords: attribute-based, anonymous access, k-times, cloud
computing
I. I NTRODUCTION
Cloud computing offers various types of computing services
to end users via computer networks and it is being widely
adopted due to its many advantages. Cloud computing provides
an extensible and powerful environment for growing amounts
of services and data by means of on-demand self-service.
It also relieves the client’s burden from management and
maintenance by providing a comparably low-cost, scalable,
location-independent platform. The benefits of cloud computing include reduced costs and capital expenditures, increased
operational efficiencies, scalability, flexibility and immediate
time to market. Different service-oriented cloud computing
models have been proposed, including Infrastructure as a
Service (IaaS), Platform as a Service (PaaS), and Software as
a Service (SaaS) [33]. Numerous commercial cloud computing
systems have been built at different levels, e.g., EC2 [1] and S3
[2] from Amazon are IaaS systems, while Google App Engine
[3] and Yahoo Pig [4] are representatives of PaaS systems,
and Googles Apps [8] and Salesforces Customer Relation
Management (CRM) System [5] belong to SaaS systems. With
these cloud computing systems, on one hand, enterprise users
are no longer required to invest in hardware/software systems
nor hire IT professionals to maintain these IT systems, thus
saving cost on IT infrastructure and human resources; on the
other hand, computing utilities provided by cloud computing
are being offered at a relatively low price in a pay-as-you-use
style.
Joseph K. Liu is the corresponding author. Joseph K. Liu and Jianying Zhou
are with Institute for Infocomm Research, Singapore; Tsz Hon Yuen is with
Huawei, Singapore; Man Ho Au is with Department of Computing, Hong
Kong Polytechnic University, Hong Kong; Willy Susilo is with University
of Wollongong, Australia; Xinyi Huang is with School of Mathematics and
Computer Science, Fujian Normal University, China.

Although the new paradigm of cloud computing provides
great advantages, there are also concerns about security and
privacy due to its Internet-based management. In the pay-asyou-use style, the cloud service providers may charge each enterprise or individual user for using the service. The traditional
solution is to setup an account for each user. A user is required
to login for using the cloud services. The service provider then
charges the user based on his/her usage. This solution works
perfectly, if privacy is not a concern. Nevertheless, it is well
acknowledged that privacy is an essential feature that must be
considered in several practical applications.
When we consider user privacy at the same time, accountbased access control does not work since it is not anonymous.
Recently proposed access control models, such as attributebased access control, can provide anonymous authentication
while it can further define access control policies based on
different attributes of the requester, environment, or the data
object. The concept of attribute-based encryption (ABE) [18],
[27] is a promising approach that fulfills these requirements.
ABE features a mechanism that enables an access control over
encrypted data using access policies and ascribed attributes
among private keys and ciphertexts. Especially, ciphertextpolicy ABE (CP-ABE) [11] provides a scalable way of encrypting data such that the encryptor defines the attribute
set that the decryptor needs to possess in order to decrypt
the ciphertext. Thus, different users are allowed to decrypt
different pieces of data with respect to the security policy. This
effectively eliminates the need to rely on the storage server for
preventing unauthorized data access.
Nevertheless, ABE only deals with authenticated access on
encrypted data in cloud storage service. It is impractical to
be deployed in the case of access control to cloud computing
service: The cloud server may encrypt a random message using
the access policy and asks the user to decrypt it. If the user can
successfully decrypt the ciphertext, it is allowed to access the
cloud computing service. Although this approach can fulfill
the requirement, it is highly inefficient.
In addition to ABE, another similar cryptographic primitive
is attribute-based signature (ABS) [22], [29], [26]. An ABS
enables a party to sign a message with fine-grained access
control over identifying information. Specifically, in an ABS
system, users obtain their attribute private keys from an
attribute authority, with which they can later sign messages
for any predicate satisfied by their attributes. A verifier will
be convinced of the fact that whether the signer’s attributes
satisfies the signing predicate while remaining completely ignorant of the identity of signer. Thus it can achieve anonymous
attribute-based access control efficiently.
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A. k-times Access Control
ABS is anonymous and unlinkable. It can be used to provide
unlimited times anonymous authentication. However, in the
cloud computing environment, unlimited times access control
is sometimes undesirable. Let us consider the following scenario. Netflix hosts its service in the cloud by enabling its
user to access the movies online. For trial users, each user
is only permitted to access 2 movies in a month. For regular
users, up to 30 movies a month is permitted and for VIP users,
there will be unlimited access. For this particular scenario,
it may be feasible to develop this system using a traditional
username/password control. However, when user privacy is
required, then the problem becomes more daunting. In this
particular scenario, user’s privacy is important as the user
wants to be ensured that the movies that he/she is viewing
will not be tracked by Netflix.
We shall note that a regular ABS is capable to provide
unlinkable and anonymous attribute access control. Yet, given
any access transcript, no one can find whether it is the user’s
first time access, second time and so forth. Thus, unfortunately
it cannot provide limited times anonymous access control.

system using some defined claim-predicate (within a period or
a single event). At the same time the user is anonymous to the
system at any time. In Table II, we compare our new notion
against k-TAA, unlinkable ring signatures (URS), linkable ring
signatures (LRS) and attribute-based signatures. We also define
the security model for this new notion. We also provide a
concrete instantiation for our system and prove the security of
our instantiation. Finally we implement our scheme to show
that it is practical.

Primitive
k-TAA
URS
LRS
ABS
Ours
a

Dynamicity
×
×
×
X
X

Anonymity
X
X
X
X
X

Unlinkability
X
X
×
X
Xor ×a

Limit
X
×
×
×
X

Our scheme provides an option for service provider to make it
linkable or unlinkable. Yet even if it is unlinkable, the service
provider knows whether the user has exceeded the k-times
access limit.
Table 1. Comparison

B. Related Works
In the area of k-times anonymous access control, some related research have been conducted in the literature. The notion
of k-times anonymous authentication (k-TAA) (such as [30],
[25], [31], [7], [14], [24], [32]) allows a user to authenticate
himself/herself to a verifier anonymously. The verifier further
knows that whether the user has been authenticated less than
k-times. Different from an attribute-based access system, the
authorized group of k-TAA has to be fixed a priori, which
makes it less flexible in practice. In contrast, an attributebased access system allows dynamicity in the control. Another
primitive that allows spontaneous anonymous access control is
the notion of ring signature [28], [15]. A ring signature allows
a user to sign on behalf of the whole group by including
their public keys or identities. The verifier only knows the
fact that the signer is one of the users within the group, but
the actual identity of the signer remains hidden. While normal
ring signature provides unlinkability, linkable ring signature
[20], [21], [6] allows the verifier to know whether the user
has signed previously (i.e., to link with previous signatures).
Intuitively, it is clear that linkable ring signature may be used
as k-times anonymous access control. Nevertheless, it requires
the signer to know the public keys or identities of all users
within the group prior to generating the signature, which is
impractical for many scenarios.
C. Our Contributions
In this paper, we propose a new notion called k-times
attribute-based anonymous access control system for cloud
computing. A normal anonymous attribute-based authentication system (e.g. ABS) does not allow the verifier to know it
is the i-th time the prover has authenticated to the system.
In contrast to this, our scheme provides a mechanism to
detect whether the user has exceeded k-times for accessing the

II. BACKGROUNDS
A. Pairings and Mathematical Assumption
Let G and GT be cyclic groups of prime order p. A map
ê : G × G → GT is bilinear if for any generators g ∈ G
and a, b ∈ Zp , ê(g a , g b ) = ê(g, g)ab . Let G be a pairing
generation algorithm which takes as input a security parameter
1λ and outputs (p, G, G, GT , ê) ← G(1λ ). The generators of
the groups may also be given. All group operations as well as
the bilinear map ê are efficiently computable.
For our scheme, we assume the following problem is
difficult to solve in the setting described above.
Definition 1: (q-Decisional Bilinear Diffie-Hellman Inver2
q
sion (DBDHI)[12]) Given the tuple (g, g α , g α , . . . , g α , T ),
1
where g ∈R G, and α ∈R Zp , decide if T = ê(g, g) α ∈ GT .
B. Monotone Span Program
We review some notation about monotone span program
using the notation in [22]. Let Υ : {0, 1}n → {0, 1} be a
monotone boolean function. A monotone span program for Υ
over a field F is an ` × m matrix M with entries in F, along
with a labeling function ρ : [1, `] → [1, n] that associates
each row of M with an input variable of Υ, that, for every
(x1 , . . . , xn ) ∈ {0, 1}n , satisfies the following:
Υ(x1 , . . . , xn ) = 1 ⇐⇒∃~v ∈ F1×` : ~v M = [1, 0, 0, . . . , 0]
and (∀i : xρ(i) = 0 ⇒ vi = 0).
In other words, Υ(x1 , . . . , xn ) = 1 if and only if the rows
of M indexed by {i|xρ(i) = 1} span the vector [1, 0, 0, . . . , 0].
We call ` the length and m the width of the span program, and
` + m the size of the span program. Every monotone boolean
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function can be represented by some monotone span program,
and a large class do have compact monotone span programs.
Below we give an example illustrating how a simple monotone boolean function Υ : (x1 , x2 , x3 ) 7→ x1 ∨ (x2 ∧ x3 ) can
be represented by a span program.


1 0
One possible realization of matrix M is: 1 1 together
0 1
with the labeling function ρ : i ∈ [1, 3] 7→ i. It is easy to
verify that for any (x1 , x2 , x3 ) such that Υ(x1 , x2 , x3 ) = 1,
we can find a vector ~v such that ~v · M = [1, 0] and that vi = 0
if xρ(i) = 0.
For example, (x1 , x2 , x3 ) := (0, 1, 1) satisfies Υ and we
can find a corresponding vector ~v as [0, 1, −1]. Note that this
vector satisfies the condition that v0 = 0 (since xρ(0) = 0). We
would like to remark that the vector is not necessarily unique.
For instance, if (x1 , x2 , x3 ) := (1, 1, 1), the vector ~v could be
[1, 0, 0] or [3, 2, −2].
On the other hand, no valid vector exists for (x1 , x2 , x3 ) if
Υ(x1 , x2 , x3 ) = 0.
III. S ECURITY R EQUIREMENT
We give our security models of anonymous attributed-based
access control scheme and define relevant security notions.
A. Syntax of Attribute-Based Access Control
Let A be the universe of possible attributes. A claimpredicate over A is a monotone boolean function, whose inputs
are associated with attributes of A. We say that an attribute
set A ⊆ A satisfies a claim-predicate Υ if Υ(A) = 1.
Definition 2: An attribute-based access control (ABAC)
scheme is a tuple of five algorithms parameterized by a
universe of possible attributes A:
• TSetup (This is a global setup algorithm to be run by
a trustee for the generation of public reference information.): On input the security parameter 1λ , generates
public reference information TPK.
• ASetup (This is a setup algorithm to be run by an
attribute-issuing authority for the generation of the secret
key and public key of the authority.): On input the
security parameter 1λ , generates a key pair (APK, ASK).
• USetup (This is a setup algorithm to be run by a user to
generate the user secret key and public key.): On input the
security parameter 1λ , generates a key pair (UPK, USK).
• AttrGen (This is a key generation algorithm to generate
the user attribute secret key. This is an interactive protocol
between the user and the authority.): It is a two party
protocol AttrGenU and AttrGenA run by the user and
the attribute-issuing authority respectively. The common
inputs are (PK = (TPK, APK), A ⊆ A, UPK). The
secret input to AttrGenU is USK and to AttrGenA is
ASK. AttrGenA outputs a secret key skA,UPK 1 .
• Auth: (This is the authentication protocol between
the user and the server.) It is a two party protocol AuthP and AuthV run by the user and the service provider respectively. The common inputs are
1 It is used to identify the case that different users may have identical
attributes in the system.

(PK = (TPK, APK), Υ, M, UPK), where Υ is the claimpredicate and M is the maximum number of authentication. The secret input to AuthP is (skA,UPK , USK, k),
where k is the number of past authentication with the
service provider. At the end, AuthV outputs accept or
reject.
Correctness. It must satisfy that authentication according
to specification are accepted if the key used is correctly
generated.
B. Notions of Security of Attributed-Based Access Control
We now describe the security properties of attributed-based
access control. Informally speaking, the attributed-based access control scheme should have the basic property of misauthentication resistance, which means that no collusion of
unregistered users and users with attributes not satisfying the
predicate can authenticate with an honest service provider. A
valid user cannot authenticate for more than M times.
For the anonymity property of attributed-based access control, it means that the service provider and the attribute-issuing
authority cannot identify the authenticating user.
We now give the formal definition for the above properties,
which are captured in the security model of authentication,
privacy and linkability.
1) AUTHENTICATION .
The security definition of authentication is divided into
two parts. The first part guarantees no user with attributes not satisfying the predicate can authenticate. No
collusion of users (that is, the merge of attributes within
different users) is allowed. This is also the traditional
definition of ABS. The second part guarantees a valid
user (with respect to the part 1 definition) cannot authenticate for more than M times, where M is specified
in the predicate.
Part 1: Authentication for a claim-predicate Υ∗ in
attributed-based access control schemes should prevent
the Adversary A to authenticate, where:
• A has some secret keys skA∗ ,UPK for some UPK
and Υ∗ (A∗ ) = 1, but A does not know the USK
corresponding to UPK;
0
• A has some secret keys skA,UPK0 for some UPK
0
∗
and has the corresponding USK , but Υ (A) 6= 1
for all A.
Our model allows collusion of these two types of users.
Authentication is defined in the following game between
the Challenger C and the Adversary A in which A is
given access to some oracles.
a) C generates TPK ← TSetup(1λ ) and (APK, ASK)
← ASetup(1λ ). C gives A the public information
PK = (TPK, APK).
b) A may query the following oracles according to
any adaptive strategy.
• UPK ← J O(). The Join Oracle runs (UPK,
USK) ← USetup(1λ ). It stores (UPK, USK) in
a list L which is initially empty. It returns UPK.
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USK ← CO(UPK). The Corrupt Oracle, on
input UPK, searches (UPK, USK) in the list L
and returns USK.
• skA,UPK ← GO(A, UPK). The AttrGen Oracle, on input an attribute set A and a UPK,
it runs the AttrGenA (PK, A, UPK, ASK) with
A (who runs AttrGenU ). A obtains the corresponding secret key skA,UPK . We require for the
same (A, UPK) as input, the same skA,UPK is
the output.
• σ ← AO(A, Υ, UPK, k, M ). The Auth Oracle,
on input an attribute set A, a UPK in L, a past
authentication number k, a maximum M and a
claim-predicate Υ such that Υ(A) = 1, k < M ,
it searches USK where (UPK, USK) ∈ L and
runs skA,UPK ← AttrGen(ASK, A, UPK).
It runs a valid AuthP protocol with
A (who runs AuthV ), and accept
←
AuthP (PK, Υ, M, UPK, skA,UPK , USK, k).
c) A gives C a claim-predicate Υ∗ , a UPK∗ , a number
M ∗ and runs AuthP protocol with C.
•

A wins the game if:
(1) AuthV (PK, Υ∗ , M ∗ , UPK∗ )=accept for the final
phase;
(2) Υ∗ (A) = 0 for all (A, UPK∗ ) queried to GO if
UPK∗ was asked to CO or UPK∗ was not outputted
by J O.
We denote by
Advauth−1
= Pr[ A wins the game ].
A
Part 2: If the user is allowed to authenticate for at most
M times, then he/she cannot run the Auth protocol for
M + 1 times without being detected. It implies that the
service provider can detect such mis-usage and reject
this authentication.
This part of authentication is defined in the following
game between the Challenger C and the Adversary A.
a) C generates TPK
←
TSetup(1λ ) and
(APK, ASK) ← ASetup(1λ ). C gives A the
public information PK = (TPK, APK). A is given
all oracles described in part 1.
b) A gives C a claim-predicate Υ∗ , a UPK∗ , a number
M ∗ and runs AuthP protocol with C for M ∗ + 1
times.
B wins the game if: AuthV (PK, Υ∗ , M ∗ , UPK∗ )
=accept for all M ∗ + 1 times and UPK∗ is an output
from J O().

2) P RIVACY.
In order to protect privacy, ABAC must hide the attributes used during authentication against the attributegenerating authority. If an honest user only authenticates
within a permitted number of times, then all his past
authentication must be anonymous and unlinkable. We
model two cases:
• If an honest user only authenticates within a permitted number of times, his/her authentication should
not be linked with his/her past authentications.
• Even if two users have the same attributes, no one,
including the service provider and the authority, can
find out who is responsible for the authentication.
This is defined in the following game between the
Challenger C and the Adversary A in which A is given
the ASK.
a) C generates TPK ← TSetup(1λ ) and (APK,
ASK) ← TSetup(1λ ). C gives A the public information PK = (TPK, APK) and also ASK.
b) A may query the oracles according to any adaptive
strategy, including J O and CO. For J O, C stores
(UPK, USK, 0) in the list L, where the last number
denotes the number of past authentication is zero.
A may also query the following oracle:
• σ ← AO(A, Υ, UPK, M ). The Auth Oracle, on input an attribute set A, a UPK in
L, a maximum M and a claim-predicate Υ
such that Υ(A) = 1, it searches USK where
(UPK, USK, k) ∈ L. It k > M , it halts
and return ⊥. Otherwise, it runs skA,UPK ←
AttrGen(PK, A, UPK, USK, ASK) with A acts
as the authority2 . It runs a valid AuthP protocol with A (who runs AuthV ), and accept ←
AuthP (PK, Υ, M, UPK, skA,UPK , USK, k).
c) A chooses two users UPK∗0 , UPK∗1 , two attribute sets A∗0 , A∗1 , a number M ∗ and a claimpredicate Υ∗ such that Υ∗ (A∗0 ) = Υ(A∗1 ) =
1, (UPK∗0 , USK∗0 , k ∗ ), (UPK∗1 , USK∗1 , k ∗ ) ∈ L3
and k ∗ < M ∗ . It sends (UPK∗0 , UPK∗1 , A∗0 , A∗1 ,
M ∗ , Υ∗ ) to C.
C chooses a random bit b ∈ {0, 1} and generates skA∗b ,UPK∗b ← AttrGen(PK, A∗b , UPK∗b ,
USK∗b , ASK). It runs AuthP (PK, Υ∗ , M ∗ , UPK∗b ,
skA∗b ,UPK∗b , USK∗b , k ∗ ) with A. C also updates
(UPK∗1−b , USK∗1−b , k ∗ + 1) ∈ L for consistency
of the two entries in L.
d) A continues to query oracles with arbitrary interleaving.
e) A outputs a bit b0 .
A wins the game if b0 = b. We denote by
Advanon
= Pr[ A wins the game ] −
A

We denote by
Advauth−2
= Pr[ A wins the game ].
A
Definition 3 (Authentication): An Attribute-Based Access Control scheme is authenticate if for all PPT adversary A, both Advauth−1
and Advauth−2
are negligible.
A
A

2 This

1
.
2

step can be omitted if the same key was generated in previous query.
means that UPK∗0 , UPK∗1 are from the output of J O and both UPK∗0
and UPK∗1 are asked to AO for k∗ times. Note that UPK∗0 may be the same as
UPK∗1 , in order to capture unlinkability for different authentications from the
same user. For different UPK0 and UPK1 , they may have the same attributes,
in order to capture the anonymity property.
3 It
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Definition 4 (Privacy): An Attribute-Based Access
Control scheme is private if for all PPT adversary A,
Advanon
is negligible.
A

attribute x the user possesses, the user also obtains htx , where
hx is the public parameters. Therefore, the final key structure
for the attribute set A is:
1

IV. O UR P ROPOSED S CHEME
In this section, we first describe our basic construction
which does not contain any event. Later we will explain how to
extend the basic construction into event-oriented in Section V.
That is, a user is allowed to access the system for a maximum
k times for a particular event. There is a counter for each
event.
A. Notation
We first give the notations used in our scheme in Table I.

A
TPK
APK
ASK
UPK
USK
A
skA,UPK
k
M
Υ
M

TABLE I: Frequently Used Notations
universe of attributes
public key of the trustee
public key of the attribute-issuing authority
secret key of the attribute-issuing authority
user public key
user secret key
an attribute set of a user
attribute secret key for a user with a set of
attributes A and user public key UPK
the number of past authentication
the maximum number of authentication allowed
the claim-predicate used for authentication
the monotone span program matrix
(with size ` × m) converted from Υ

B. Intuition
We extend the key generating system for group signatures
[13] into the attribute-based setting. The original key structure
in [13] is
y
sk = (g α+s , g s , hs ),
where (y, α) is the secret key of the group manager and s is
the user identity.
We have two technical difficulties when adapting this key
structure. Firstly, we have to add the user secret key to the
system to avoid the possible attacks from malicious attributeissuing authority. Secondly, we have to replace the simple
identity-based construction into more complicated attributedbased setting.
For the first problem, we consider y as the secret key of the
user and Y = ĝ y as the corresponding public key. In order
to avoid the user changing his/her public and secret key after
obtaining his/her attributed-based secret key, the first part of
1
the key is changed to (Y g) α+s . Hence the user public key
is bound with the attributed-based secret key if the discrete
logarithm logg ĝ is hard.
For the second problem, we attempt to merge the attributebased key system of the instantiation 3 in [22] into the above
construction. Therefore, we change s = at where a is also the
secret key of the attribute-generating authority. Then for each

sk = ((Y g) α+at ,

g at ,

hat ,

htx for all x ∈ A).

The authentication protocol works as follows. The user runs
the zero-knowledge proof of knowledge protocol to prove that
he knows his attribute secret key skA,UPK and user secret key
USK = y (both correspond to the user public key UPK) such
that
1
Υ(A) = 1 ∧ C = ê(g, g) y+H(k)
Note that the tuples {skA,UPK , y, Y } will not be sent to the
service provider. The user will only prove (in zero-knowledge)
that he has the knowledge of these tuples. If the proof goes
through, that means the user has the required attributes and
it is his k-th time authentication. The service provider stores
C in its database and checks whether the newly received C
exists in its database or not. If it is already in the database, that
means the user has re-used k and will reject his authentication.
C. Construction
Let A be the desired universe of attributes. This construction
supports all claim-predicates whose monotone span programs
have width at most n, where n is an arbitrary parameter. We
treat A = Z∗p as the universe of attributes, where p is the size
of the cyclic group used in the scheme.
Our attribute-based access control construction is as follows.
TSetup: Let λ be a security parameter. The trustee runs
param = (G, GT , p, ê) ← G(1λ ), randomly picks generators
g, ĝ, h ∈ G. For i ∈ [1, n], it picks δi , ∈ Zp . It also picks
a collision resistant hash function H : {0, 1}∗ → Zp . For
i ∈ [1, n], it sets
hi = hδi ,

1

ĥi = h δi .

It publishes TPK = (param, g, ĝ, h, h1 , . . . , hn , ĥ1 , . . . , ĥn , H).
ASetup: The attribute-issuing authority randomly picks α, a ∈
Zp . Suppose φ : A → [1, n] is a mapping function. It publishes
authority public key APK = (g α , ĥa1 , . . . , ĥan , φ) and sets
authority secret key ASK = (α, a).
USetup: The user randomly picks y ∈ Zp . It publishes user
public key UPK = Y = ĝ y and sets user secret key USK = y.
AttrGen: The key generation algorithm takes as input
TPK, APK, UPK = Y and a subset of attributes A ⊂ A. The
user runs a zero-knowledge proof of knowledge protocol P K0
with the attribute-issuing authority to prove the knowledge of
his user secret key y:
P K0 {y : Y = ĝ y }.
This proof of knowledge of discrete logarithm is straightforward and is shown in the next subsection. If the proof is
correct, the attribute-issuing authority first chooses a random
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t ∈ Zp and uses the authority secret key ASK to create the
attribute secret key skA,UPK for the user as
1

K = (Y g) α+at ,
Kx =

htφ(x)

L1 = g at ,

L2 = hat ,

∀x ∈ A.

Auth: The authentication algorithm takes as input the public
keys TPK, APK and a claim-predicate Υ. The user has some
additional inputs including an attribute secret key skA,UPK for
attribute A, a user secret key USK = y and the number of
past authentication k. Assume Υ(A) = 1.
More concretely, first convert Υ to its corresponding monotone span program M = (Mi,j ) ∈ (Zp )`×m , with row labeling
ρ : [1, `] → A. The maximum number of authentication M is
determined by Υ. (We refer the reader to the PhD thesis of [9]
and the appendix of [19] for a discussion of how to perform
this conversion.) Also compute the vector ~v = (v1 , . . . v` ) ∈
Z`p that corresponds to the satisfying assignment A. Then the
user parses skA,UPK as (K, L1 , L2 , {Kx |x ∈ A}). Then he
1
computes C = ê(g, g) y+H(k) and sends (C, k) to the service
provider and runs the following proof of knowledge protocol
with the service provider:
v`
v1
P K1 {(K, L1 , L2 , Kρ(1)
, . . . , Kρ(`)
, y) :

Implementation of Protocol P K0 :

ê(K, g α L1 ) = ê(ĝ y g, g)
∧

is convinced then the other party (called the prover) indeed
knows some “knowledge”.
If R is a binary relation, we let R(x) = {y : (x, y) ∈ R}
and the language LR = {x : ∃y such that (x, y) ∈ R}. If
(x, y) ∈ R, we call y the witness of x.
A proof of knowledge is a two-party protocol with the
following properties:
1) Completeness: If (x, y) ∈ R, the honest prover who
knows witness y for x succeeds in convincing the honest
verifier of his knowledge.
2) Soundness: If (x, y) ∈
/ R, no cheating prover can
convince the honest verifier that (x, y) ∈ R, except
with some small probability. It can be captured by the
existence of a knowledge extractor E to extract the
witness y: given oracle access to a cheating prover P ,
the probability that E outputs y must be at least as high
as the success probability of P in convincing the verifier.
For a zero-knowledge proof of knowledge, it has the extra
property of Zero-knowledge: no cheating verifier learns anything other than (x, y) ∈ R. It is formalized by showing that
every cheating verifier has some simulator that can produce a
transcript that is indistinguishable with an interaction between
the honest prover and the cheating (or honest) verifier.

P K0 {y : Y = ĝ y }.

ê(h, L1 ) = ê(L2 , g)
1
y+H(k)

∧

C = ê(g, g)

∧

(
ê(L2 , h),
aMi,j
vi
ê(Kρ(i) , ĥφ(ρ(i)) ) =
1,
i=1
`
Y

if j = 1,
}
if 1 < j ≤ m.

If the above proof is valid and k < M , the service provider
checks if C is used in past authentications. If true, the service
provider rejects. If false, the service provider accepts the
authentication and stores C for future checking. The user
updates k ← k + 1.
Remarks:
1) The user may not have Kρ(i) for every attribute ρ(i)
mentioned in the claim-predicate. But when this is the
case, vi = 0, and so the value is not needed. Detailed
implementation of P K1 is given in the next subsection.
2) If the user does not increment k, his/her next round
authentication will be rejected. It can be easily seen
1
from the fact that as C = ê(g, g) y+H(k) , y is fixed (it
is user secret key) and if k is unchanged, then C is
also unchanged and thus will be detected by the service
provider.
3) If the user has been authenticated for more than M times
(that is, k ≥ M ), although the service provider will
reject its further access, it still cannot revoke its identity.
The privacy of the user is still preserved.

Suppose Alice wants to prove the knowledge of y to Bob. Alice
picks a random number r ∈ Zp and send the commitment
R = ĝ r to Bob. Bob returns a random challenge c ∈ Zp .
Alice computes the response z = r + cy. Bob verifies that
ĝ z = R · Y c . The soundness and the zero-knowledgeness are
straightforward.
(Soundness) Suppose the simulator is given a discrete logarithm instance (ĝ, Y ), it uses Y as the public key. Given
a transcript (R, c, z), it rewinds to obtain another transcript
(R, c0 , z 0 ). Since both of them are valid, it means that
0

0

Hence the simulator can obtain z−z
c−c0 as the solution of logĝ Y .
(Zero-knowledge) Given the public key ĝ, Y , the simulator can
randomly picks c, z ∈ Zp and computes R = ĝ z Y −c . The
transcript (R, c, z) has the same distribution as those coming
from Alice and Bob.
Implementation of Protocol P K1 :
v`
v1
, y) :
P K1 {(K, L1 , L2 , Kρ(1)
, . . . , Kρ(`)

ê(K, g α L1 ) = ê(ĝ y g, g)
∧

ê(h, L1 ) = ê(L2 , g)

∧

C = ê(g, g) y+H(k)

1

∧
D. Implementations of Protocol P K0 and P K1
We first briefly introduce the proof of knowledge as defined
in [10]. Intuitively, a two-party protocol constitutes a system
for proofs of knowledge if one party (called the verifier)

0

ĝ z Y −c = ĝ z Y −c .

`
Y
i=1

aMi,j
vi
ê(Kρ(i)
, ĥφ(ρ(i))
)

(
ê(L2 , h),
=
1,

if j = 1,
}
if 1 < j ≤ m.

PK1
is
a
zero-knowledge
proof-of-knowledge
protocol which allows the prover Alice to convince
a verifier Bob that she knows a set of elements
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BK

=

1G
ê(AK , g α AL1 )
ê(h, AL1 )ê(AL2 , g −1 )
C −H(k) ê(g, g)
Q
ê(AL2 , h−1 ) `i=1 ê(Ai , Ĥi,1 )
Q`
i=1 ê(Ai , Ĥi,2 )

=
=
=
=
=
=
..
.
=

∧
∧

Q`

i=1

ê(Ai , Ĥi,m )

gνK hµK
−µL
BK 1 gβ2 hβ1
ê(g, g α AL1 )µK ê(AK , g)µL1 ê(g, g−1 )β1 ê(ĝ, g)y
µL1
−1 µL2

ê(h, g)
ê(g, g )
Cy
Q
ê(g−1 , h)µL2 `i=1 ê(g, Ĥi,1 )µi
Q`
µi
i=1 ê(g, Ĥi,2 )
Q`

i=1

ê(g, Ĥi,m )µi

































Fig. 1: P K1 representation
v`
v1
, y) ∈ G`+2 × Z∗p satisfying
, . . . , Kρ(`)
(K, L1 , L2 , Kρ(1)
the following m + 3 equations simultaneously.

ρµL1 , ρµL2 , ρβ1 , ρβ2 , ρµ1 , . . ., ρµ` , ρy ∈R Z∗p and
computes the following m + 5 values, usually referred
to as commitments.

ê(K, g α L1 ) = ê(ĝ y g, g)
ê(h, L1 ) = ê(L2 , g)
1

C = ê(g, g) y+H(k)
Y`
i=1
Y`
i=1

aM

vi
i,1
ê(Kρ(i)
, ĥφ(ρ(i))
) = ê(L2 , h)
aM

vi
i,j
ê(Kρ(i)
, ĥφ(ρ(i))
)=1

for j ∈ [2, m].

vi
For i = 1 to ` we use κi to denote the value Kρ(i)
. The
vi
reason is that Alice is proving to Bob that she knows Kρ(i)
,
which does not means she know Kρ(i) or vi . Likewise, we
aMi,j
use Ĥi,j to denote the value ĥφ(ρ(i))
for i = 1 to `, j = 1 to
m. The value of Ĥi,j can be computed locally by both Alice
and Bob.
While there are known and efficient techniques for proving
discrete logarithm relationship as well as general pairingproduct equation, the above set of equations does not fall
into those categories. Thus, additional tricks are applied.
Specifically, Bob chooses additional generators g, h of group
G so that discrete logarithm of h to base g is unknown to
Alice. Next, Alice chooses a set of random values in Z∗p : µK ,
νK , µL1 , µL2 , µ1 , . . ., µ` and computes the following ` + 4
auxiliary values.

AK
AL1
A1

= KgµK ,
= L1 gµL1 ,
= κ1 gµ1 ,
···

BK
AL2
A`

= gρνK hρµK ,

T2
T3
T4
T5
S1
S2

=
=
=
=
=
=
..
.

BK L1 gρβ2 hρβ1 ,
ρ
ê(g, g α AL1 )ρµK ê(AK , g) µL1 ê(g, g−1 )ρβ1 ê(ĝ, g)ρy ,
ρµL
ρ
ê(h, g) 1 ê(g, g −1 ) µL2 ,
C ρy ,
Q`
ρ
ê(g−1 , h) µL2 i=1 ê(g, Ĥi,1 )ρµi ,
Q`
ρµi
,
i=1 ê(g, Ĥi,2 )

Sm

=

Q`

−ρµ

i=1

ê(g, Ĥi,m )ρµi .

Alice sends (T1 , . . . , T5 , S1 , . . . Sm ) to Bob. In practice,
ê(g, g), ê(h, g) and ê(g, g) can be pre-computed and
S1 , . . . , Sm can be computed as follow, so that only a
constant number of pairing operation is needed:
 Q

ρµ
ρ
`
S1 = ê(g−1 , h) µL2 ê g, i=1 Ĥi,1i ,
 Q

ρµ
`
S2 = ê g, i=1 Ĥi,2i ,
..
.
 Q

ρµ
`
Sm = ê g, i=1 Ĥi,mi
•
•

= gνK hµK ,
= L2 gµL2 ,
= κ` gµ`

Alice sends these ` + 4 auxiliary values to Bob. Then, P K1
can be represented as a zero-knowledge proof-of-knowledge of
the set of `+7 values (µK , νK , µL1 , µL2 , µ1 . . . , µ` , y, β1 , β2 ),
where β1 = µK µL1 and β2 = νK µL1 . Using the CamenischStadler notations, the representation of P K1 is shown in
Figure 1.
a) Complete Specification of P K10 : : For completeness,
we describe the honest-verifier zero-knowledge version of
P K10 assume the auxiliary elements are computed by Alice
and has been sent to Bob. Note that the honest-verifier zeroknowledge protocol described below can be turned into full
zero-knowledge using the technique described in [16].
• Commitment Phase: Alice randomly picks ρµK , ρνK ,

T1

Challenge Phase: Bob randomly picks c ∈R Zp and sends
c to Alice.
Response Phase: Alice computes the following ` + 7
values, usually referred to as responses.
zµK

•

=

ρµK − cµK ,

zνK

=

ρνK − cνK ,

zµL1

=

ρµL1 − cµL1 ,

zµL2

=

ρµL2 − cµL2 ,

zβ1

=

ρβ1 − cµK µL1 ,

zβ2

=

ρβ2 − cνK µL1 ,

zµ1

=

ρµ1 − cµ1 , . . . zµ` = ρµ` − cµ` ,

zy

=

ρy − cy

Alice sends (zµK , zνK , zµL1 , zµL2 , zβ1 , zβ2 , zµ1 , . . . ,
zµ` , zy ) to Bob.
Verification Phase: Bob validates the proof by evaluating
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the following m + 5 equations.
T1
T2

?

=
?

BcK gzνK hzµK ,
−zµL

gzβ2 hzβ1 ,

=

BK

?

ê(AK , g α AL1 )c ê(g, g α AL1 )zµK ê(AK , g)
·ê(g, g−1 )zβ1 ê(ĝ, g)zy ,
c
z
ê(h, AL1 )ê(AL2 , g −1 ) ê(h, g) µL1
−1 zµL2
·ê(g, g )
,
c
−H(k)
C
ê(g, g) C zy ,
c
Q`
ê(AL2 , h−1 ) i=1 ê(Ai , Ĥi,1 )
Q
z
`
·ê(g−1 , h) µL2 i=1 ê(g, Ĥi,1 )zµi ,
c Q`
Q`
zµi
,
i=1 ê(g, Ĥi,2 )
i=1 ê(Ai , Ĥi,2 )

T3

=

T4

=

T5

=

?

?

?

S1

=

S2

=
..
.

Sm

=

?

?

1

zµL

Q`

i=1

1

follows: For any set of witnesses K, L1 , L2 , κ1 , . . . , κ` , there
exists a unique set of randomness µK , νK , µL1 , µL2 , µ1 , . . .,
µ` such that the auxiliary values are computed by from the
set of witnesses using the particular set of randomness. Thus,
the auxiliary values picked by S is correctly distributed.
Soundness of P K1 . Soundness of P K10 guarantees existence of a simulator E 0 which allows our construction of E to
extract from the prover the set of values (µK , νK , µL1 , µL2 ,
β1 , β2 , µ1 , . . ., µ` , y). It remains to show how E can obtain
the set of witnesses K, L1 , L2 , κ1 , . . . , κ` , y which satisfies the
equations for P K1 .
E first invokes E 0 . The, it computes κ̂i as Ai g−µi for
i = 1 to `. Furthermore, E computes K̂ = AK g−µK ,
L̂1 = AL1 g−µL1 and L̂2 = AL2 g−L2 .
Due to soundness of P K10 , for j = 2 to m:

c Q `
zµi
ê(Ai , Ĥi,m )
i=1 ê(g, Ĥi,m )

Bob accepts the proof if and only if all the above equalities holds. In practice, ê(ĝ, g), ê(h, g), ê(g, g), ê(g, g−1 ),
ê(g, g) and ê(g, g) can be pre-computed and S1 , . . . , Sm
can be computed as follow, so that a number of pairing
operation can be saved:

c
Q`
?
S1 =
ê(AL2 , h−1 ) i=1 ê(Ai , Ĥi,1 )
 Q

zµ
z
`
·ê(g−1 , h) µL2 ê g, i=1 Ĥi,1i ,

c  Q`
Q`
zµi
?
S2 =
i=1 ê(Ai , Ĥi,2 ) ê g,
i=1 Ĥi,2 ,
..
.

c  Q`
Q`
zµi
?
Sm =
ê(A
,
Ĥ
)
ê
g,
Ĥ
i
i,m
i=1
i=1 i,m
In addition, the auxiliary values can be sent in conjunction
with the commitment in the commitment phase. Thus, the
resulting protocol still consists of three message flows.
b) Soundness and Zero-Knowledgeness of P K1 : Our
instantiation of P K1 thus consists of the auxiliary values
AK , BK , AL1 AL2 , A1 , · · · , A` , in addition to P K10 . It
is straightforward to show that P K10 is honest-verifier zeroknowledge. That is, there exists an efficient algorithm, called
simulator S 0 , which, on input a random challenge c, can output a communication transcript (T1 , . . . , T5 , S1 , . . . , Sm ) and
(zµK , zνK , zµL1 , zµL2 , zβ1 , zβ2 , zµ1 , . . . , zµ` , zy ) whose distribution is identical to those coming from Alice. Furthermore,
P K10 is sound, meaning that there exists another efficient
algorithm, called extractor E 0 , which is capable of outputting
the underlying set (µK , νK , µL1 , µL2 , β1 , β2 , µ1 , . . ., µ` , y)
of knowledge when it is given blackbox access to a prover in
P K10 .
Honest-Verifier Zero-Knowledgeness of P K1 Thus, to
show that our instantiation of P K1 is honest-verifier zeroknowledge, we only need to demonstrate to construct another
simulator S, which is capable of outputting the transcript of
the whole P K1 on input challenge c.
Our construction of S simply picks at random AK , BK ,
AL1 AL2 , A1 , · · · , A` ∈R G and invokes the zero-knowledge
simulator S 0 for P K10 . The transcript outputted by S 0 will
be correct, and it remains to show that the auxiliary values
picked by S is also correctly distributed. The argument is as

`
Y

ê(Ai , Ĥi,j ) =

i=1

`
Y

ê(g, Ĥi,j )µi .

i=1

Q`

Q`

µi
Thus,
i=1 ê(Ai , Ĥi,j ) =
i=1 ê(g, Ĥi,j ) . It implies
Q`
−µi
, Ĥi,j ) = 1G . That is,
i=1 ê(Ai g
`
Y

ê(κ̂i , Ĥi,j ) = 1G .

i=1

Similarly, soundness of P K10 assures:
ê(AL2 , h−1 )

`
Y

ê(Ai , Ĥi,1 )

i=1

= ê(g−1 , h)µL2

`
Y

ê(g, Ĥi,1 )µi .

i=1

Rearranging the terms:
`
Y

ê(Ai g−µi , Ĥi,1 ) = ê(AL2 g−µL2 , h).

i=1

Thus,
`
Y

ê(κ̂i , Ĥi,1 ) = ê(L̂2 , h).

i=1

In addition, soundness of P K10 guarantees:
C −H(k) ê(g, g) = C y .
It means C y+H(k) = ê(g, g). That is:
1

C = ê(g, g) y+H(k) .
Furthermore, soundness of P K10 guarantees:
ê(h, AL1 )ê(AL2 , g −1 ) = ê(h, g)µL1 ê(g, g −1 )µL2 .
Rearranging the terms:
ê(h, AL1 g−µL1 ) = ê(AL2 g−µL2 , g).
This is,
ê(h, L̂1 ) = ê(L̂2 , g).
Finally, soundness of P K10 guarantees:
−µL1 β2 β1

BK = gνK hµK ∧ 1G = BK

g h .
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and

Rearranging the terms:
νK µK

BK = g

h

∧

µ
BKL1

β2 β1

=g h .

Due to the discrete logarithm assumption, β1 = µK µL1 .
Recall that soundness of P K10 guarantees:
ê(AK , g α AL1 )
=

ê(g, g α AL1 )µK ê(AK , g)µL1 ê(g, g−1 )β1 ê(ĝ, g)y .

Putting β1 = µK µL1 and rearranging the terms:
ê(AK g−µK , g α AL1 g−µL1 ) = ê(ĝ, g)y .
Thus,
ê(K̂, g α L̂1 ) = ê(ĝ, g)y .
E outputs (K̂, L̂1 , L̂2 , κ̂1 , . . . , κ̂` , y) as the set of witnesses
satisfying P K1 . Therefore, our instantiation of P K1 is sound.
E. Security Analysis
Theorem 1: The above scheme is authenticate in the generic
group model.
Proof: We divide the proof into two parts according to
our definition in Section III-B.
Part 1: The proof is given in the generic group model following [22]. Denote the public information h = g δ0 , ĝ = g ξ , for
some δ0 , ξ ∈ Zp . The public information includes:
δ0

(g, g δ0 , g α , g ξ , {g δ0 δi , g δi , g

aδ0
δi

1+ξyk

(g α+atk , g atk , g atk δ0 , {g δ0 tk δφ(x) }x∈Ak ).
We now proceed with the proof, following the standard
approach for generic groups. Let Lin(S) be the set of functions
that are linear in the terms in the set S. Let Hom(S) be the
subset of Lin(S) of homogeneous functions whose constant
coefficient is zero. In the generic group model, the forgery
generated by the adversary is a fixed function of the inputs
given in the security experiment.
Suppose the adversary returns a claim-predicate Υ∗ , a
UPK∗ , a number M ∗ and runs the AuthP protocol correctly.
Since the P K1 protocols is sound 4 , the adversary has a
secret key for some attribute set A∗ and UPK∗ , such that
Υ∗ (A∗ ) = 1.
More concretely, first convert Υ∗ to its corresponding
∗
monotone span program M∗ = (Mi,j
) ∈ (Zp )`×m , with
∗
row labeling ρ : [1, `] → A. Also compute the vector
~v ∗ = (v1∗ , . . . v`∗ ) ∈ Z`p that corresponds to the satisfying
assignment A∗ . Suppose the adversary’s secret extracted from
P K1 has the form
∗

∗

i=1

∗
aMi,j

δφ(ρ∗ (i))

= l1∗ δ0 zj

∀j ∈ [1, m],

where (z1 , z2 , . . . , zm ) = (1, 0, . . . , 0). The rest of our proof
proceeds by assuming these constraints are functionally equivalent, and eventually obtaining a contradiction: that there
exists a k0 ∈ [n] such that Υ∗ (Ak0 ) = 1. In other words,
the adversary could have authenticated legitimately with the
signing key for Ak0 , and thus the output is not a forgery. We
know that k ∗ , l1∗ , l2∗ , {kj∗ }j=ρ∗ (1),...,ρ∗ (`) ∈ Lin(Γ), where
Γ = ({1, δ0 , α, ξ} ∪ {δ0 δj ,
∪{

aδ0 δ0
, }j∈[1,n]
δj δj

1 + ξyk
, atk , atk δ0 , {δ0 δφ(x) tk }∀x∈Ak }k∈[1,q] ),
α + atk

where q is the number of AttrGen Oracle and Auth Oracle.
The rest of our analysis proceeds by comparing terms in these
constraints. We can show that the multi-linear functions given
by the adversary’s forgery cannot contain terms of certain
kinds. Since δ0 l1∗ = l2∗ , we get that:
l1∗ ∈ Hom({δj ,

1 a
, }j∈[1,n] ∪ {atk , {δφ(x) tk }x∈Ak }k∈[1,q] ).
δj δj

Next, observe that k ∗ (α + l1∗ ) = 1 + ξy ∗ . Therefore
y ∗ ∈ Hom(y1 , . . . , yq ).

l1∗ ∈ Hom(
Denote wk∗ =

a
a
, . . . , , at1 , . . . , atq ).
δ1
δn

1+ξyk
α+atk .

Then
X
k ∗ (α + l1∗ ) =
wk∗ Ak (α + atk ) + C,
k

for some constant C ∈ Zp and coefficients Ak . The above
equation has degree 1 random variables α and a. Therefore,
l1∗ ∈ Hom(at1 , . . . , atq ). Recall that
`
∗
X
akρ∗∗ (i) Mi,j
·
= l1∗ δ0 zj
∗ (i))
δ
φ(ρ
i=1

∀j ∈ [1, m],

Consider any tk0 such that it has a non-zero coefficient in l1∗ .
For i ∈ [1, `], construct vi∗ such that
vi∗ =

kρ∗∗ (i)
δ0 δφ(ρ∗ (i)) · [tk0 ]l1∗

,

where the [x]π notation denotes the coefficient of the term x
in π. We see that v ∗ is a vector of constant coefficients which
satisfies the equation v ∗ M ∗ = [z1 , . . . , zm ] = [1, 0, . . . , 0].
Further, in every position where vi∗ 6= 0, the set Ak0 surely
contained the attribute ρ∗ (i). By the properties of the monotone span program, it must be the case that Γ∗ (Ak0 ) = 1, and
thus the adversary did not win the game.

∗

(g k , g l1 , g l2 , {g kj }j=ρ∗ (1),...,ρ∗ (`) , y ∗ )
To be a forgery, we require that k ∗ (α+l1∗ ) = 1+ξy ∗ , δ0 l1∗ = l2∗
4 The

kρ∗∗ (i) ·

As a result,
}i∈[1,n] ).

We first observe that the AttrGen Oracle and the Auth
Oracle can be sampled by generating the k-th secret key for
Ak of the form

∗

`
X

soundness of P K1 is proven in Subsection IV-D.

Part 2: The simulator S generates the public parameters for
the zero-knowledge proof of knowledge P K1 , together with a
knowledge extractor E. S generates the rest of TPK honestly
and runs (APK, ASK) ← ASetup(1λ ). S gives A the public
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information PK = (TPK, APK).
The adversary A wins by successfully authenticating for
M ∗ + 1 times while using the value M ∗ as the upper bound
during each authentication. By the soundness property of
P K1 , S can use the knowledge extractor E to extract
1

Ci = ê(g, g) y+H(ki ) ,
for all i ∈ [1, M ∗ + 1], where Ci , ki is used for the i-th
authentication. Observe that the values ki ∈ [1, M ∗ ] for all
i. It implies that at least two values of ki are identical by the
pigeonhole principle. It implies that their corresponding Ci are
identical (by the soundness of P K1 ). However, it contradicts
that the service provider will reject the authentication for
repeating Ci value. Therefore no polynomial time adversary
can win this game if the P K1 protocol is sound.
By combining part 1 and part 2, we have proved the
theorem.
Theorem 2: The above scheme is private if the P K0 and
P K1 protocols are zero knowledge 5 and the decisional qa BDHI assumption holds, where qa is the number of Auth
Oracle query.
Proof: Observe that C is actually the output of the
pseudo-random function (PRF) in [17] with input H(k) and
the key y. Suppose the adversary A wins the privacy security
game with the simulator S. Then we show that S can break
the pseudo-randomness property of C in [17] when interacting
with its challenger B.
S receives some public parameters (g, Y ) of the PRF from
B. Then S honestly generates the rest of TPK, APK and ASK;
and then sends them to A.
For the oracle query J O, S honestly generates the key
pair (UPK, USK), except for one time, it sets UPK = Y
and USK = ⊥, which means that it does not know the
corresponding secret key. If A asks for the CO with input
Y , S declares failure and exits 6 . If A asks for the AO with
UPK = Y , S first finds the corresponding k value stored. S
asks the oracle from its PRF challenger B with input H(k).
1
Then S receives the value C = ê(g, g) y+H(k) from B. If S
has not obtained skA,UPK for the attribute set A, then S uses
the simulator of the zero-knowledge proof P K0 to generate a
valid proof for AttrGen; and obtains the key from A. S uses
the value C, skA,UPK and the simulator of the zero-knowledge
proof P K1 to generate a valid proof for the authentication.
In the challenge phase, A chooses two users UPK∗0 and
UPK∗1 . If none of them equals to Y , then S declares failure
and exits. Otherwise, without loss of generality, suppose
UPK∗0 = Y and the corresponding counter value as k ∗ . S
submits H(k ∗ ) to the PRF challenger B and receives C ∗ ,
1
which may be equal to ê(g, g) y+H(k∗ ) or a random element
in GT . After that, S uses this C ∗ and the simulator of the
zero-knowledge proof P K1 to generate a valid proof.
Further oracle queries can be simulated as before. Finally,
A submits its guess b0 . If A wins, then S guesses C ∗ =
1
ê(g, g) y+H(k∗ ) . Otherwise, S guesses C ∗ is a random group
element.
5 The

By the zero knowledge property of the P K0 protocol, the
authority does not know about the key y during the AttrGen
algorithm. By the zero knowledge property of the P K1
protocol, it is easy to see that the protocol does not leak any
information about skA,UPK . The only possible information that
can be gathered by A is from the linkability tag C ∗ . Observe
that C ∗ is actually the output of the pseudo-random function
in [17] with input H(k) and the key y. Since the pseudorandomness property of C in [17] holds if the decisional qa BDHI assumption holds, the privacy of our scheme also holds
under the same assumption.

F. Efficiency Analysis
We analyze the efficiency of our scheme for the Auth protocol, in terms of the monotone span program which is actually
an ` × m matrix. We count the number of exponentiation,
multi-exponentiation (≈ 1.25 exponentiation [23]) and pairing
operation on both the user side and the server side based on
the implementation of P K1 in Section IV-D. The result is
summarized in Table II.
TABLE II: Summary of computation requirements
User
Server
exponentiation
8
m
multi-exponentiation
6+m
6+m
pairing
1+m
5 + (` + 1) × m
Finally, we consider the storage requirement for the service
provider for checking purpose. Recall that the service provider
only needs to check the value C during authentication.
Therefore, it only needs to store a GT element after each
authentication, whose size depends on the security parameter.
As an example, to achieve a 80-bit of security, the size of a
GT element is around 1024 bits. Hence, the extra storage is
only about 1Gb about one million authentications. Similarly,
the comparison of this 1Gb data should also be efficient on
the cloud server.
G. Implementation
We implemented our scheme for the following cases: First,
we assume there are N different groups of users who can
access the system. For group i, where i ∈ [1, N ], there are
Pi policies. For example, group 1 = ‘‘Student’’ AND
‘‘’Computer Science Dept’’. That means it has 2
policies. That is, P1 = 2. In addition, each user in group
1 can access the system for k1 times. We simulate the system
for different cases. In each case, for simplicity, we assume
P1 = . . . = PN . We also assume k1 = 1, . . . , kN = N .
The general access policy can be expressed as


(A1,1 AND A1,2 AND . . . AND A1,P1 ) AND k ≤ k1


OR
(A2,1 AND A2,2 AND . . . AND A2,P2 ) AND k ≤ k2
OR

zero knowledge property of P K0 and P K1 is proven in Section IV-D.
that A cannot corrupt all user public keys.

6 Note

OR

 .........

(AN,1 AND AN,2 AND . . . AND AN,PN ) AND k ≤ kN
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Fig. 2: Running time of the Auth protocol

where Ai,j represents the j-th policy of group i; and k is the
current number of access times for the user.
The running time result of Auth is plotted in Figure 2. The
testing makes use of the Type-a pairing on the elliptic curve
Y 2 = X 3 + X over a 512-bit finite field with embedding
degree 2 from the pairing-based library (version 0.5.12)7 .
The specification of the testing platform is summarized in
Table III.
TABLE III: Testing Platform
OS
Ubuntu 10.10
CPU
Pentium(R) Dual-Core
Memory
2GB RAM
Hard disk
500G/5400rpm
Programming language
C

server two times yesterday (but none for today) should be
allowed to access again today. However, in the basic version
this cannot be achieved. If the student sets k = 3, the system
will deny his/her authentication directly since k > 2. If
he/she sets k = 1 (or 2), the system will find the same C
in its database and thus deny his/her authentication. This is
because the basic version does not support event oriented
access control.
A simple solution to make it event oriented is to put the
event description into the hash function H. For example, we
can add
event = ‘‘A student can access Matlab server
2 times on 1st Feb 2013.’’
into the hash. That is, we can set
1

C = ê(g, g) y+H(k||event)
V. E XTENSIONS
In the last section, we have described the basic version
of our system. In this section, we discuss some possible
extensions to make it more practical.
A. Event Oriented Access Control
In the basic version, the user is linkable (and may be denied
for access) if there is only one event or one claim-predicate.
For example, suppose a student is allowed to access Matlab
server two times a day. If a student who has accessed Matlab
7 http://crypto.stanford.edu/pbc/

In this way, if the student wants to access Matlab on 2nd Feb,
the hash output will be different even if k = 1 or k = 2.
The same logic can be applied to a different claim-predicate.
For example, Alice is a student (who can access to Matlab
2 times a day) and she is also a part time staff (who
can access to Matlab 3 times a day). Then she should be
able to access Matlab 5 times a day. By using this event
oriented solution, if Alice gains access using her student
role, the event should be ‘‘A student can access
Matlab server 2 times on 1st Feb 2013.’’. If
she gains access using her staff role, then event should be ‘‘A
part time staff can access Matlab server 3
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times on 1st Feb 2013.’’. Obviously the hash outputs of these two events are different. Therefore she will not
be linked if she has not exceeded the maximum number of
access times from the appropriate role.
B. An Option for Unlinkability
In the basic scheme, it allows the server to know the number
of times a user has accessed (yet does not know the identity)
as k is known to the server. Some servers may need this
data for statistical purpose. For example, today 10 users have
accessed 8 times, 5 users have accessed 5 times and 13 users
have accessed just once. This is good in some scenarios or
applications.
On the other side, sometimes unlinkability may be preferred
as more privacy will be provided to users. In the basic
scheme, if the number of authenticators is very few, it becomes
linkable easily. Consider the following example. Alice and Bob
are engineers in the university. They are allowed to access
Matlab on the server 10 times a day. Assume there are only
two engineers in the university. Today Alice has accessed
once while Bob has not yet accessed the server. When Alice
accesses the server on her 2nd time, although the server does
not know it is Alice, it must know that it is from the same
person who has previously accessed. It is because during her
second access, k = 2 is sent to the server while for Bob’s first
access, k = 1. Even if there are many engineers, the server
may also link a particular user easily. For example, Alice has
accessed the server 8 times a day and Bob has accessed the
server 5 times a day, while other users have accessed the server
at most twice. If the next authenticator presents the information
k = 9 to the server, it knows that this is the one who has
accessed 8 times although it does not know it is Alice.
If unlinkability is preferred, we can require the user to
choose a random fresh k ∈ [1, M ] (which has not been used
before) instead of a sequential one. We use the above example
to illustrate why by choosing a random k can make the system
unlinkable. Since a random k is chosen every time, in Alice’s
2nd time access, k can be any integer from 1 to 10 (instead
of k = 2). Similarly, in Bob’s 1st access, k can be any integer
from 1 to 10 (instead of k = 1). Thus the server has no idea
whether the access is from Bob or Alice. Note that even if
Alice and Bob both choose the same k, the server only knows
that they are from different users but still cannot link to any
previous access.
There is also a trade-off for unlinkability. T he user needs to
store every k he has used in previous authentication processes
in this event while he only needs to store the previous k in
the sequential version.
VI. C ONCLUSION
In this paper, we coined a new cryptographic notion called
k-times attribute-based anonymous access control, which is
particularly designed for supporting cloud computing environment. This notion allows a user to authenticate himself/herself
to the cloud computing server anonymously. Further, a ktimes limit for anonymous access control is also provided. This
means that the server may restrict a particular set of users to

access the systems for a maximum k-times within a period
or an event, meanwhile further access will be denied. We
provided a security model as well as a concrete instantiation
of this new notion. Our implementation result shows that our
scheme is practical. Further, we provide the security proof for
our instantiation. We also extended this notion to allow event
oriented access control, as well as an option for unlinkability.
These extensions are of independent interest.
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